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Abstract 
Many literatures investigate the causal impact of income on economic outcomes, for example 
in the context of intergenerational transmission or well-being and health. Some studies have 
proposed to use employer wage differentials and in particular industry affiliation as an 
instrument for income. We demonstrate that industry affiliation is correlated with fixed 
individual characteristics, specifically parents’ education and own height, conditional on the 
covariates typically controlled for in these studies. These results suggest that there is selection 
into industries based on unobservables. As a result the exclusion restriction in many IV 
studies of this type is likely violated.  
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1 Introduction
Many literatures ask about the causal impact of income on a variety of eco-
nomic outcomes. One example is intergenerational transmission; the question
whether children of richer parents fare better in terms of their own economic
performance (Solon, 1999). Another example is the health-income gradient:
higher income individuals tend to be healthier. Is this association causal, do
richer individuals di¤er in other dimensions, or does the causality run the
opposite way (Cutler, Lleras-Muney, Vogl, 2011)? Furthermore, income is
an important correlate in happiness regressions relating individual life satis-
faction to various economic determinants (Blanchower and Oswald, 2004).
Does higher income cause happiness?
Sorting out causality in these and other applications is di¢ cult. A num-
ber of studies in the literature have used employer wage di¤erentials and
particularly industry a¢ liation as an instrumental variable for individual or
family income. Examples of such studies are Shea (2000) who uses industry
a¢ liation, union membership, and job loss as instruments for parentsincome
in order to learn about intergenerational transmission. Luttmer (2005) uses
interactions of industry and occupation as instruments for income in happi-
ness regressions, an avenue also followed by Luechinger (2009). This idea has
been extended by Pischke (2011), who focuses on industry di¤erentials only,
and has also been used by Li et al. (2011).
Industry wage di¤erentials in particular are large and remain after con-
trolling for many covariates including individual xed e¤ects (Krueger and
Summers, 1988; Gibbons and Katz, 1992) and ability test scores (Blackburn
and Neumark, 1992). As a result, researchers using these wage di¤erentials
as instruments for income may have a reasonable claim of identifying causal
e¤ects of income not contaminated by unobserved personal attributes and
selection. In this note we provide some evidence to caution against this
optimism. Following the same specications as in Pischke (2011) we show
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that industry di¤erentials correlate with mothers education and own height.
Both of these variables are pre-determined by the time industry a¢ liation is
measured, and should therefore not be a¤ected by industry choice.
The statistical association with industry wage e¤ects which we nd there-
fore suggests selection in industry choice which correlates with personal char-
acteristics related to parental background and height. These characteristics
might, for example, be unmeasured cognitive or non-cognitive skills or per-
sonality traits. We conclude by discussing why we think the types of variables
we use, mothers education and height, might be useful as specication checks
but o¤er little hope in improving inference in regression or IV frameworks.
We conjecture that this remains true for even for better measures of the
underlying omitted skills or traits, like ability test scores.
2 Data
In order to study the e¤ect of parental education we use data from the 1972
to 2006 waves of the US General Social Survey (GSS). The GSS is a repeated
cross-sectional survey, carried out every one to two years. The GSS is also
the main dataset analyzed in Pischke (2011) and we use the same sample
restrictions. The primary sample consists of employed men aged 20  64
without missing values for any of the covariates used in the analysis.
Our outcome measures of primary interest are happiness and parental
education. Happiness is transformed as explained in Pischke (2011), so that
all results can be interpreted in terms of standard deviation units. As main
parental education variable we use the highest year of completed schooling
of the respondents mother. We exclude missing values and those individuals
reporting zero years of education. We focus on mothers education because
there are fewer missing values in mothers education than in fathers educa-
tion. Using fathers education or combining the education of both parents
yields comparable results.
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Family income, our main regressor, is a bracketed variable and we assign
midpoints as described in Pischke (2011). Industry and occupation a¢ liation
of the respondent are aggregated into 32 and 22 categories, respectively.
Details are given in the appendix.
The wives sample consists of married females aged 20 to 64 with employed
husbands. The industry and occupation variables used in this sample refer
to the husbands, while other controls refer to the respondent.
In order to corroborate our results on parental education from the GSS we
also present results on body height using the US National Health Interview
Survey (NHIS). The NHIS is also a repeated cross-section carried out every
year with about 30,000 to 50,000 respondents per wave. We use waves from
1974 to 2009 and restrict the sample to employed men aged 20-64.
Our outcome measures of primary interest in the NHIS are self-reported
health and self-reported body height. Self-reported health is the answer
to the question Would you say your health in general is excellent, very
good, fair, or poor?We transform this health measure the same way as
happiness in the GSS such that results can be interpreted in terms of standard
deviations. Body height is measured in centimeters.
We group industry and occupation a¢ liations of the respondent into 28
and 18 categories, respectively, These groups are relatively commensurate
with the GSS classications, although a precise correspondence is not possi-
ble. Details are in the appendix.
3 Results
Table 1 displays regressions of happiness on the logarithm of family income
for the sample of men from the GSS. Each column shows results for a di¤erent
set of included controls. The specications in each column are estimated by
OLS, 2SLS and using Ackerberg and Devereuxs (2009) Improved Jackknifed
IV estimator (IJIVE). In the rst four columns we reestimate the baseline
3
specications from Pischke (2011) in the sample without missing values for
mothers education. In columns (5) to (8) we repeat these regressions includ-
ing mothers education as an additional control.
The OLS specications in the rst row indicate a positive and signicant
association of family income with happiness that is robust to the inclusion
of a broad set of control variables. Using industry a¢ liation as instrument
for family income results in somewhat higher and less precisely estimated
coe¢ cients. The coe¢ cients in the rst four columns are very similar to the
estimates in Pischke (2011) although the IV results are slightly higher.
In columns (5) to (8) we repeat the baseline regressions including the
years of education of the respondents mother as additional control vari-
able. Maternal education is an important component of a respondents family
background. If there is strong selection into industries due to unobservables
related to a respondents family background then the inclusion of mothers
education should substantially change our IV estimates. This is not the case:
coe¢ cient estimates are virtually identical to those in the earlier columns.
These results might suggest that omitted variable bias due to unobserved
heterogeneity in family background is not particularly important. In other
words, selection into industries based on family background does not seem
to be a major issue.
But this is not the end of the story. In Table 2 we look at this potential
selection issue from a di¤erent angle. Instead of including mothers education
as a control we use this proxy for family background as dependent variable.
The rst four columns display the baseline results from the previous table.
In columns (5) to (8) we repeat these regressions using as dependent variable
mothers education instead of the respondents happiness. In columns (5) and
(6) the pattern of results is remarkably similar to those for happiness. There
is a strong correlation between income and mothers education. IV estimates
are larger than OLS estimates. It is di¢ cult to think of these results as
causal e¤ects: income di¤erences due to industry a¢ liation should not a¤ect
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predetermined parental education. So the obvious conclusion to draw is that
these estimates reect selection bias. Estimates are lower in columns (7) and
(8) where we include occupation dummies as controls. But standard errors
are large so that this is probably just due to sampling variation as we dont
nd a similar pattern in the NHIS data described below.
In Table 3 we turn to results for married women. Pischke (2011) uses
this group as a specication check. If the correlations between industry
income di¤erentials and happiness are due to selection we should see less of
an association between husbands industry a¢ liation and wifes happiness. In
particular, for working wives we can control for the womans own industry,
which should be a reasonable guard against selection e¤ects. In the sample we
analyze here the IV estimates for income in the regressions using happiness
for working wives are a lot lower than those for men. This is not the case
in the original sample used in Pischke (2011) where the results for working
wives di¤ered little from those for the husbands. In any case, there is no
evidence in either sample that controlling for wivesown industry a¢ liation
(which should take care of any selection) lowers the coe¢ cient on income.
Turning to the results using mothers education as dependent variable
we nd much more consistent results across specications. The IV results
are generally large and well above the OLS results. Controlling for wives
own industry does nothing to the results. Pischke (2011) took this type of
evidence as support for the causal interpretation of the results on happiness.
Our results for mothers education cast doubt on the usefulness of the wives
sample as a specication check since a causal interpretation does not make
sense for this dependent variable.
Using the same sample, in Table 4 we turn to the type of instrument set
used in Luttmer (2005) combining both industry a¢ liation and occupation.
We nd that mothers education is even more strongly related to occupation
than industry wage di¤erentials. This suggests that neither variable is useful
in order to generate exogenous variation in income.
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In Table 5 we explore other employer characteristics as instruments, in-
cluding union status used in Shea (2001). Our inference here is hindered
by the fact that the IV results for mothers education are very imprecisely
estimated. The point estimates using union status and rm size are negative
and numerically large but not statistically signicant. As a result, we can say
relatively little about these employer attributes from the small GSS samples.
In order to corroborate our ndings further we turn to data from the
NHIS to look at health as an outcome. While health is an important outcome
in its own right another advantage of the NHIS is the much larger sample
sizes compared to the GSS. Unfortunately, the NHIS o¤ers less employment
related information. So we return to industry a¢ liation as the instrument
here. We check the health results using height as an alternative outcome
which should not be a¤ected by industry a¢ liation. Body height is largely
xed by age 20 (Hamill, 1977).
Columns (1) to (3) of Table 6 reveal IV coe¢ cients slightly below the
OLS results. Taken at face value, these results suggest that a sizeable por-
tion of the association between health and income is due to a causal e¤ect
running from income to health with something of an upward bias to the OLS
results. However, as with our ndings for mothers education, the results
for height shed doubt on this interpretation. The association between in-
come and height becomes stronger in the IV estimates cautioning against
interpreting these results causally. The results in this larger sample are
more precisely estimated that those from the GSS, and they are very stable
independently of what controls are included.
In Table 6 we use a sample of men aged 20 64, similar to the sample
from the GSS used for tables 1 and 2. One caveat with this age group is that
older men tend to shrink slightly, and this may be related to income. To
guard against this we also present results for men aged 20 29 in Table 7, an
age group for whom this should not be a concern. The large sample sizes in
the NHIS easily facilitate such cuts of the data. The results are qualitatively
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very similar to those in Table 6, so di¤erential shrinkage does not seem to be
a factor in our ndings.
4 Interpretation
Our results mirror earlier ndings by Blackburn and Neumark (1992) regard-
ing the association of industry wage di¤erentials and ability measures. These
authors found that ability measures like IQ type test scores are strongly cor-
related with industry wage di¤erentials. On the other hand, controlling for
the test scores hardly alters estimated industry e¤ects in a wage regression.
We nd the same pattern of results for mothers education and height. How
do these results make sense, and what do they tell us about various empir-
ical strategies to uncover causal e¤ects in the type of applications we have
discussed, which use income as a (potentially endogenous) regressor?
We discuss these issues in the following statistical framework. Consider
the regression equation
hi = yi + xi + "i (1)
where hi is an outcome like health, happiness, or childrens income, yi is own
income, xi is a confounder, and "i is a regression residual, orthogonal to yi and
xi. Conditional on the confounder xi the regression coe¢ cient  is the causal
e¤ect of income on hi. xi may correspond to di¢ cult to observe attributes
like ability, personal traits, etc. We will also assume that conditional on the
confounder xi industry a¢ liation is random. Hence, we can interpret our IV
results as replacing income yi in (1) by its prediction using industry wage
e¤ects.
Income is related to the confounder by the regression equation
yi = xi + vi: (2)
The confounder xi is not directly observed. Instead, we observe a proxy
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correlated with xi characterized by the regression
mi = xi + ui (3)
wheremi might be mothers education or own height. We assume cov(vi; ui) =
0, i.e. only xi links income with the measure mi.
Here, we give some intuition for our results within this framework. We
derive the relevant implications formally in the appendix. Our regression
results indicate that income matters for mothers education (or height) both
in the OLS and IV regressions (Table 2, cols. (5) to (8)). This implies both 
and  have to be positive, since xi is the only link between these two variables.
Our next nding is that the estimated e¤ect of income on the outcome hi
is basically the same whether we control formi in the regression or not (Table
1, cols (1) to (4) versus (5) to (8)). One explanation for the results is that
the noise in the measure mi is large (i.e. 2u  0). This noise is a classical
measurement error and does not matter when mi is on the left hand side, so
the measuremi is still useful to glean information on whether there is any bias
in the OLS or IV regressions (from the mi on yi regression). But the noise
leads to attenuation when usingmi on the right hand side of the regression, so
it becomes essentially useless as a control in this case. This seems to make
sense for measures like mothers education and particularly height, which
clearly must be very crude variables to get at the true underlying confounder
xi. Variables like ability test scores should be better proxies for xi; in
the sense that  is larger and/or 2u smaller. However, the Blackburn and
Neumark (1992) results indicate that even ability test scores exhibit pretty
much the same features. As a result the available variables of this type seem
to o¤er little mileage as controls in regression studies. Our insights here are
not new; they are very much reminiscent of Griliches (1977) in his discussion
of estimating the returns to schooling.
In order to interpret the IV results in this context think of replacing
income with the part of income predicted by industry wage e¤ects. For this
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predicted income, the relative size of  and 2v may be di¤erent compared
to raw income (which is relevant for the OLS results). The IV results for
happiness are above the OLS estimates, and this is true for the regression
of mothers education as well. Within this particular framework this has to
imply that  becomes more important relative to 2v for predicted income.
This implies that both the OLS and IV results are biased upwards but the
IV results are biased even more.
Let us make this slightly more precise. In terms of our framework in
eqs. (1) and (2) the variable vi is a valid instrument for income. In other
words, the variation in income due to a valid instrument needs to satisfy the
condition  = 0. This motivates using the IV regression of mi on yi as a
specication check. In practice, few instruments might satisfy the condition
 = 0 literally. Moreover, most instruments use little of the variation in the
endogenous regressor. As a result, both  and 2v will be lower in the IV
case. We show in the appendix that IV is less biased than OLS whenever
=
 
2 + 2v

is smaller for the income predicted by the instrument than for
raw income.  may be very small for predicted income but this is of little
comfort with relatively weak instruments, an insight which goes back to
Bound, Jaeger and Baker (1995). These authors show that the relative bias
of IV is related to the size of the partial R2 or F -statistic on the excluded
instruments in the rst stage. These metrics are not just important to assess
small sample bias in two stage least squares regressions but also asymptotic
bias due to small violations of the exclusion restrictions in the form of  6= 0.
5 Conclusion
In this note we have assessed the usefulness of industry wage di¤erentials as
instruments in regression models for happiness or health with income as an
endogenous regressor. Our conclusion is broadly negative: we do not believe
that industry wage di¤erentials o¤er a useful source of variation in income
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to establish causal e¤ects. This is based on OLS and IV regressions using
xed personal characteristics as left hand side variables in the respective
regressions, which show large e¤ects. One obvious, though hardly novel
conclusion from our work is that a healthy degree of doubt about the use of
instrumental variables is often warranted, even when the IV regressions pass
some purported specication tests. Using xed personal characteristics as
dependent variable o¤ers a useful specication check. We argue that this is
the case even for variables which might be poorly measured and are of little
value as control variables. Such variables should be available in many data
sets.
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6 Appendix
The variables hi, yi, mi, and xi are dened by the regression equations
hi = yi + xi + "i
yi = xi + vi
mi = xi + ui:
Normalize xi so that var(xi) = 1.
Consider the regression of yi on mi
yi = mi + eyi
 =
cov(mi ; yi)
var(mi)
=
cov (xi + ui; xi + vi)
2 + 2u
=

2 + 2u
so that the residual of yi after ltering out mi is given by
eyi = yi   mi = yi   
2 + 2u
mi:
The variances are
var(yi) = 
2 + 2v =


2 + 2u
2  
2 + 2u

+ var(eyi)
var(eyi) = 2 + 2v   22
2 + 2u
=
 
2 + 2u
  
2 + 2v
  22
2 + 2u
=
22v + 
2
u
 
2 + 2v

2 + 2u
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Finally note that the regression coe¢ cient of xi on eyi is
bxey = cov(xi ; eyi)
var(eyi) =
cov

xi ; yi   2+2umi

var(eyi)
=
cov

xi ; xi + vi   2+2u (xi + ui)

var(eyi)
=
   2
2+2u
var(eyi) = 
 
2 + 2u
  2
22v + 
2
u
 
2 + 2v

=
2u
22v + 
2
u
 
2 + 2v
 :
Our primary interest is the regression
hi = byi + cmi + ei
and we get
b =
cov(hi ; eyi)
var(eyi) = cov(yi + xi + "i ; eyi)var(eyi)
=
var(eyi) + cov(xi ; eyi)
var(eyi)
=  + bxey =  +  2u
22v + 
2
u
 
2 + 2v
 :
and running
hi = b
yi + ei
b =  + bxy =  + 
cov(xi ; yi)
var(yi)
=  + 
cov (xi ; xi + vi)
2 + 2v
=  + 

2 + 2v
This corresponds to the regression coe¢ cient we get from regressing hi on yi
without controlling for mi, i.e. the regressions in Tables 1 and 2, cols. (1) to
(4).
14
Finally, consider the regression of mi on yi, corresponding to the regres-
sions in columns (5) to (8) of Table 2:
mi = dyi + e
m
i
d =
cov(mi ; yi)
var(yi)
=

2 + 2v
:
This demonstrates the claim that d > 0 implies  > 0 and  > 0.
In the OLS results we basically nd b = b i.e. controlling for mi hardly
matters in the regression of hi on yi (Table 1, cols (1) to (4) versus (5) to
(8)). If we make 2u large we get
lim
2u!1
bxey = 
2 + 2v
= bxy:
On the other hand, 2u does not gure in the expression for d, so poor mea-
surement does not a¤ect the regression of mi on yi.
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Coding of industries in the GSS 
    
 Sector GSS 1972 – 1988 1970 Census codes 
GSS 1989 – 2006 
1980 Census codes 
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishery 17-28 10-31 
2 Mining 47-57 40-50 
3 Construction 67-77 60 
4 Lumber, wood, furniture 107-118 230-242 
5 Stone, clay, glass 119-138 250-262 
6 Metal 139-169 270-301 
7 Machinery, exc. electrical 177-198, 258 310-332 
8 Electrical machinery 199-209 340-350 
9 Transportation equipment 219-238 351-370 
10 Professional equipment 239-259 371-382 
11 Food and tobacco 268-299 100-130 
12 Textile, apparel, leather 307-327, 388-397 132-152, 220-222 
13 Paper 328-337 160-162 
14 Printing 338-339 171-172 
15 Chemicals 347-369 180-192 
16 Petroleum and rubber 377-387 200-212 
17 Other manufacturing 259, 398 390-392 
18 Transportation 407-429 400-432 
19 Communication 447-449 440-442 
20 Utilities 467-479 460-472 
21 Wholesale trade 507-588 500-571 
22 Retail trade 607-698 580-691 
23 Finance, insurance, real estate 707-718 700-712 
24 Business services 727-748 721-742 
25 Repair services 749-759 750-760 
26 Personal services 769-798 761-791 
27 Recreation services 807-809 800-802 
28 Health 828-848 812-840 
29 Legal services 849 841 
30 Education 857-868 842-860 
31 Religious and welfare services 877-879 861-871, 880 
32 Other services 869, 887-897 872, 881-892 
33 Public administration 907-937 907-937 
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 Coding of occupations in the GSS 
 
 
 Occupation GSS 1972 – 1988 1970 Census codes 
GSS 1989 – 2006 
1980 Census codes 
1 Administrative and managerial 1, 56, 201-246 3-37 
2 Engineers 2, 6-26 43-63 
3 Math and computer scientists 2-5, 34-36, 55 64-68 
4 Natural scientists 42-54 69-83 
5 Health professionals 61-73 84-89 
6 Health treatment occupations 74-76 95-106 
7 Post-secondary teachers 102-140 113-154 
8 Teachers, exc. post-secondary 141-145 155-159 
9 Counsellors, librarians, archivists 32-33, 174 163-165 
10 Social scientists, urban planners 91-96 166-173 
11 Social and religious workers 86-90, 100, 101 174-177 
12 Lawyers and judges 30-31 178-179 
13 Writers, artists, athletes 175-194 183-199 
14 Technicians and support occupations 80-85, 150-173 203-235 
15 Sales occupations 260-296 243-285 
16 Clerical and admin. support occupations 301-396 303-389 
17 Private household workers 980-986 403-407 
18 Protective services workers 960-976 413-427 
19 Service workers, exc. 17 and 18 901-954 433-469 
20 Farming occupations 801-846 473-499 
21 Crafts and repair workers 401-586 503-699 
22 Operators and laborers 601-796 703-889 
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Coding of industries in the NHIS 
 
  NHIS 1974 - 1994 NHIS 1995-2003 NHIS 2004-2009 
 Sector 1970 Census codes 1980 Census codes   
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishery 17-28 10-31 1, 2 1-5 
2 Mining 47-57 40-50 10 6-8 
3 Construction 67-77 60 20 10 
4 Lumber, wood, furniture, stone, clay, glass 107-138 230-262 40 17, 30 
5 Metal 139-169 270-301 41 24, 25 
6 Machinery, exc. electrical 177-198, 258 310-339 43, 42 26 
7 Electrical machinery 199-209 340-350 44 27, 28 
8 Transportation equipment 219-238 351-370 45 29 
9 Food and tobacco 268-299 100-130 30 11, 12 
10 Textile, apparel, leather 307-327, 388-397 132-152,220-228 31 13-16 
11 Printing and paper 328-339 160-175 32 18, 19, 50 
12 Chemicals, petroleum, rubber 347-369, 377-387 180-219 33 20-22 
13 Other manufacturing 239-259, 398 259,371-399 46, 34 31, 23 
14 Transportation 407-429 400-439 50-52 47-49 
15 Communication 447-449 440-449 53 52-53, 51 
16 Utilities 467-479 450-499 54 9 
17 Wholesale 507-588 500-579 60 32-34 
18 Retail 607-698 580-699 61-65 35-46 
19 FIRE 707-718 700-719 70-71 54-60 
20 Business services 727-748 720-750 75 62 
21 Repair services 749-759 751-760 76 74 
22 Personal services 769-798 761-792 77-78 75 
23 Recreation and entertainment 807-809 800-811 79 69-71 
24 Health 828-848 812-840 80-81 65-68 
25 Educational 857-868 842-861 82-83 64 
26 Religious and welfare services 877-879 862-871,880 84 76 
27 Other services, inc. legal 869, 887-897, 849 841,872-877,881-899 85 72, 73, 77, 61, 63 
28 Public administration 907-937 900-990 90 78 
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Coding of occupations in the NHIS 
 
 NHIS 1974 - 1994 NHIS  1995-2003 NHIS  2004-2009 
          Occupations 1970 Census code 1980 Census code   
1 Administrative and managerial 1,200-249, 56 3-39 1-3 1-5 
2 Engineers 2-27,34-55,57-58 42-83 4-6 7-10,12-13 
3 Health professionals 60-73 84-89 7 29 
4 Health treatment occs 74-79 90-106 8 32-34 
5 Teachers 32-33,102-149,174 110-165 9 20-23 
6 Other professional occs 30-31,86-101 166-179 11 14,16-19 
7 Writers, artists, athletes 175-199 180-199 10 25-28 
8 Technicians and support 80-85,150-173 200-239 12-13 11,15,30-31 
9 Sales occupations 250-297 240-299 14-16 53-57 
10 Clearical and admin support 301-399 300-399 17-21 58-64 
11 Services: protective 950-989 413-432 23-24 35-38 
12 Services: food 910-919 433-444 25 39-42 
13 Services: cleaning, private hh 900-909,980-986 401-410,448-455 22,27 43-45 
14 Services: personal 931-959 456-469 28 46-52 
15 Services: health 921-930 445-447 26 32-34 
16 Farming 801-846 470-499 29-31 65-68 
17 Crafts and repair 400-599 500-699 32-34 74-77 
18 Operators and laborers 600-798,848-899 703-899 35-41 78-93 
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Table 1 
Regressions of Happiness on ln of Family Income for Men 
General Social Survey, 1972 – 2006 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Estimation method   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
OLS  0.172 0.128 0.124 0.097 0.171 0.126 0.122 0.096 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) 
          
2SLS  0.266 0.187 0.293 0.303 0.265 0.182 0.295 0.305 
  (0.075) (0.078) (0.095) (0.092) (0.075) (0.078) (0.095) (0.092) 
          
IJIVE  0.276 0.192 0.321 0.335 0.275 0.187 0.323 0.338 
  (0.082) (0.087) (0.111) (0.107) (0.083) (0.087) (0.111) (0.108) 
          
First stage F-statistic  11.77 10.88 7.06 7.04 11.72 10.77 7.08 7.06 
Baseline controls         
4 marital status dummies           
21 occupation dummies              
4 job satisfaction dummies              
Mother's education              
 
Weighted regressions using GSS sampling weight. The coefficient on ln(family income) is displayed. Baseline controls are age, age squared, 
dummies for black and other non-white race, eight education dummies, and 25 year dummies. Instruments are 32 industry dummies. Number of 
observations is 10,547. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2 
Regressions of Happiness and Mother’s Education on ln of Family Income for Men 
General Social Survey, 1972 – 2006 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  Dependent Variable 
  Happiness  Mother's education 
Estimation method   (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8) 
           
OLS  0.172 0.128 0.124 0.097  0.166 0.220 0.173 0.165 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)  (0.047) (0.048) (0.049) (0.048) 
           
2SLS  0.266 0.187 0.293 0.303  0.266 0.479 0.050 0.054 
 (0.075) (0.078) (0.095) (0.092)  (0.244) (0.257) (0.306) (0.307) 
           
IJIVE  0.276 0.192 0.321 0.335  0.282 0.515 0.040 0.047 
 (0.082) (0.087) (0.111) (0.107)  (0.268) (0.286) (0.355) (0.356) 
           
First stage F-statistic  11.77 10.88 7.06 7.04  11.77 10.88 7.06 7.04 
Baseline controls           
4 marital status dummies              
21 occupation dummies               
4 job satisfaction dummies                   
           
Weighted regressions using GSS sampling weight. The coefficient on ln(family income) is displayed. Baseline controls are age, age squared, 
dummies for black and other non-white race, eight education dummies, and 25 year dummies. Instruments are 32 industry dummies. Number of 
observations is 10,547. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 3 
Regressions of Happiness on ln of Family Income for Married Men and Women 
General Social Survey, 1972 – 2006 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  Dependent Variable 
  Happiness  Mother's education 
  Sample  Sample 
    Wives, Wives,    Wives, Wives, 
  Husbands Wives not working working  Husbands Wives not working working 
Estimation method   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5)   (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) (10) 
             
OLS  0.189 0.105 0.114 0.102 0.103  0.387 0.314 0.391 0.245 0.217 
 (0.023) (0.019) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027)  (0.072) (0.060) (0.085) (0.088) (0.091) 
             
2SLS  0.180 0.042 0.127 -0.010 0.010  0.654 0.777 0.564 0.537 0.431 
 (0.109) (0.080) (0.103) (0.107) (0.122)  (0.358) (0.258) (0.327) (0.352) (0.401) 
             
IJIVE  0.179 0.036 0.126 -0.024 -0.003  0.688 0.824 0.605 0.587 0.482 
 (0.125) (0.087) (0.123) (0.124) (0.146)  (0.407) (0.280) (0.391) (0.404) (0.478) 
             
First stage F-statistic  8.85 11.75 5.78 7.54 6.03  8.85 11.75 5.78 7.54 6.03 
Baseline controls             
32 industry dummies (wives)                 
Number of observations   6,672  7,540  3,062  4,478 4,478   6,672  7,540  3,062  4,478 4,478 
 
Weighted regressions using GSS sampling weight. The coefficient on ln(family income) is displayed. Baseline controls are age, age squared, 
dummies for black and other non-white race, eight education dummies, and 25 year dummies. Instruments are 32 industry dummies for husband’s 
industry affiliation. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 4 
Comparison with Luttmer (2005) 
Men, General Social Survey, 1972 – 2006 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  Dependent Variable 
Estimation method 
 Happiness  Mother's education 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
         
OLS  0.172 0.172 0.172  0.166 0.166 0.166 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)  (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) 
         
2SLS  0.266 0.328 0.283  0.266 1.238 0.273 
 (0.075) (0.072) (0.048)  (0.244) (0.239) (0.143) 
         
IJIVE  0.276 0.344 0.339  0.282 1.326 0.337 
 (0.082) (0.077) (0.071)  (0.268) (0.256) (0.213) 
         
First stage F-statistic  11.77 20.64 3.19  11.77 20.64 3.19 
Instruments   Industry Occupation Ind*Occ   Industry Occupation Ind*Occ
 
Weighted regressions of happiness on ln(family income) using GSS sampling weight. The coefficient on ln(family income) is displayed. All 
regressions include controls for are age, age squared, dummies for black and other race, eight education dummies, and 25 year dummies. 
Instruments are 32 industry, 21 occupation dummies, or their interactions. Number of observations is 10,547. Heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors in parentheses. 
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Table 5 
Alternative Instruments Using Employer Differentials 
Men, General Social Survey, 1972 – 2006 
(Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  Dependent variable 
  Happiness  Mother's education 
  Instruments  Instruments 
    Union and Union and    Union and Union and 
  Union status Firm size firm size industry  Union status Firm size firm size industry 
Estimation method   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
             
OLS  0.175 0.173 0.161 0.175  0.116 0.052 0.067 0.116 
 (0.018) (0.022) (0.026) (0.018)  (0.056) (0.073) (0.091) (0.056) 
           
2SLS  0.242 0.208 0.321 0.274  -0.785 -0.435 -0.656 0.169 
 (0.184) (0.160) (0.169) (0.078)  (0.603) (0.491) (0.553) (0.251) 
           
IJIVE  0.243 0.215 0.342 0.284  -0.798 -0.485 -0.749 0.174 
 (0.187) (0.175) (0.190) (0.086)  (0.611) (0.538) (0.616) (0.277) 
           
First stage F-statistic  66.89 11.32 9.60 11.8  66.89 11.32 9.60 11.80 
Baseline controls            
Number of observations   7,365  4,444  3,082  7,365  7,365  4,444  3,082  7,365 
 
Weighted regressions of happiness on ln(family income) using GSS sampling weight. The coefficient on ln(family income) is displayed. Baseline 
controls are age, age squared, dummies for black and other non-white race, eight education dummies, and 25 year dummies. Instruments are a 
dummy for union status, six dummies for firm size categories, and/or 32 industry dummies. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6 
Regressions of Health and Height on ln of Family Income for Men 
NHIS, 1974-2009 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
 
  Dependent variable 
  Health  Height 
Estimation method  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
         
OLS  0.135 0.130 0.124  0.770 0.781 0.731 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) 
         
2SLS  0.071 0.060 0.097  1.017 0.991 1.241 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.012)  (0.088) (0.091) (0.114) 
         
IJIVE  0.071 0.060 0.097  1.018 0.992 1.242 
  (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)  (0.088) (0.091) (0.115) 
         
First stage F-statistic  493.3 478.0 333.7  493.3 478.0 333.7 
         
Baseline controls        
        
4 marital status dummies        
        
17 occupation dummies        
 
Weighted regressions using NHIS sampling weight. The coefficient on ln(family income) is displayed. Baseline controls are age, age squared, 
dummies for non-white, six education dummies, three region dummies, and 25 year dummies. Instruments are 27 industry dummies. Number of 
observations is 458,601. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 7 
Regressions of Health and Height on ln of Family Income for Men Aged 20-29 
NHIS, 1974-2009 
(standard errors in parentheses) 
 
 
 
Weighted regressions using NHIS sampling weight. The coefficient on ln(family income) is displayed. Baseline controls are age, age squared, 
dummies for non-white, six education dummies, three region dummies, and 25 year dummies. Instruments are 27 industry dummies. Number of 
observations is 121,344. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
  Dependent variable 
  Health  Height 
Estimation method  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
         
OLS  0.095 0.094 0.093  0.606 0.607 0.572 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)  (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
         
2SLS  0.061 0.048 0.076  0.867 0.874 0.805 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)  (0.155) (0.156) (0.197) 
         
IJIVE  0.061 0.047 0.076  0.869 0.876 0.808 
  (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)  (0.156) (0.157) (0.199) 
         
First stage F-statistic  114.2 113.9 67.98  114.2 113.9 67.98 
         
Baseline controls        
4 marital status dummies        
17 occupation dummies        
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